June 1971: Psychological Warfare

Joint Security Committee Assemble

June 1971 saw the Glastonbury Festival open with David Bowie headlining to massive crowds. Meanwhile in Northern Ireland, politicians and key members of the authorities were gathering themselves to review papers that were put together to analyse the current situation.

At the beginning of June 1971 (11th), there was an interesting paper presented at the meeting of the Joint Security Committee. The paper was titled 'Publicity and Psychological Warfare against Terrorists', and looks at the impact propaganda has had on the ongoing conflict.

The contents (via the PRONI Enquiry Service) were as follows;

The various newspapers, news shoots and pamphlets circulated by extremist organisations or their supporters are liberally garnished with lies, half-truths and material designed to attract sympathy and support for the extremist and terrorism and to delude the sympathisers with those who support law and order that their causes are losing ground.

It is therefore worthwhile examining the potential of a strategy of good publicity and well-directed psychological attack on terrorists.

Questions for consideration are;

What is already being done in this sector by the Army and RUC?

is it sufficient, adequately coordinated and related to available intelligence?

Is the speed of reaction to specific events fast enough? If not, can the effort and reaction speed be improved?

Is adequate expertise on the subject available?

What are the consequential problems resulting from greater involvement in this form of attack (embarrassment of Government, blowback by misapplication of bad luck etc)?

If there is a prima facie case for further action in this sector, by which procedures should a carefully planned strategy be formulated?

Possible lines of action could include;

Poster photos of men wanted for questioning (have you seen this man?).

Anti-IRA posters; maimed children, rioting children, wrecked pubs.

Press articles on the IRA as criminals as opposed to the earlier concepts of patriots - anti-violence - disenchanted extremist recants etc.

Press leaks on various matters - false warning of Army searches planned in named areas - money discrepancies in organisation funds.

It’s not uncommon in any state of conflict, war or unrest for propaganda to be used by both sides to either defuse a situation. or rally for support. It’s quite clear here that there were people of influence who were keen to explore all potential avenues to seek control of the ongoing situation in Northern Ireland.

On Sunday, the 13th of June, in defiance of a government ban, 2,000 members of the Orange Order attempted to march through the mainly Catholic town of Dungiven, County Londonderry. Around 500 RUC officers and 650 British Army soldiers were on duty in the town. A cordon had been set up by soldiers at a bridge over the River Roe.

Orangemen in regalia fought with soldiers and threw stones, bottles, and other missiles, resulting in three people being arrested, including Rev. William McCrea, a Free Presbyterian minister. The trouble lasted for approximately two hours.

The following day Brian Faulkner, then NI Prime Minister, issued a statement,

"I totally condemn all those who influenced this crowd to assemble for a parade they knew to be illegal"

The statement did not mention the name of the Orange Order.

June 1971 ended as it had begun, with further papers presented at the meeting of the Joint Security Committee. This time the subject was public attitudes to security operations.

The contents (via the PRONI Enquiry Service) were as follows;

The apparent lack of confidence on the part of the general in the ability of the Government and the security forces to defeat the IRA may be due to some extent to the fact that present objectives and methods are not fully understood.

The IRA campaign is being conducted in the glare of publicity. Questions are being asked inside and outside Parliament about the conduct of operations, and in answering these questions a balance has to be struck between the needs of security and the importance of keeping the public properly informed.

Statements about measures being taken to remove the IRA threat appear to make little impact. The public are told that the enemy are being defeated by a process of attrition. They are losing men, weapons and morale, and this is proved by a running total of firearms captured, of casualties suffered and of persons convicted. The organisation of the IRA is allegedly being broken up by unrelenting pressure; the security forces are operating a policy of deterrence and are reducing hostile initiative; there is a rapid and effective response to attack. Generalities of this kind appear frequently in speeches and communique but fail to carry conviction.

One reason may well be that actual results are not observable. There are, it is true, exceptions. For example, searches are usually well publicised, the methods understood and the results shown in actual figures. The same applies to the control of crowds and processions; the security forces are seen in action and their success measured.

But other tasks are not so readily understood, or if they are understood their effectiveness is questioned. This is particularly true of road checks, which, it should be remembered, bring large numbers of ordinary citizens directly into contact with the security forces. The fact that only a few show resentment at the inconvenience caused should not obscurethe fact that the majorityregard road checks as largely a waste of time. They would argue that an impressive tally of vehicles stopped and searched proves nothing. A study of road check technique is now underway, and will be awaited with interest. In the meantime there is need for some public assurance that manpower is being effectively used on this type of security task.

Patrolling is another activity which is imperfectly understood. The constable on the beat performs the traditional role of deterring the ordinary criminal, and the mobile patrol is a recognised extension of this role. But the effectiveness of the mobile patrol as a means of combating the IRA is not widely accepted. To the casual observer it seems relatively easy for the armed gunmen to escape the attention of the security forces when used in this way. But again, a good deal of ignorance prevails as to the precise tasks allotted to patrols, whether mounted or otherwise.

The control of the border has been the subject of a special review. Many people are arguing much stricter methods of control without fully appreciating the problems involved, the manpower requirements of the cost effectiveness of any new measure. But again, the balance of advantages as between the deployment of more forces on the border and their use in other areas and on other tasks, has not been spelt out.

There is furthermore the vaxed question of protecting buildings and target installations. The impression given is of a belated reaction to events on the part of the authorities.

This impression might be removed if it were possible not merely to show that extra protection was being provided but also to explain and justify the taking of risks where targets can only be protected at the expense of an unacceptable dispersion of effort.

What is being argued is the need for the public to be taken into confidence rather more than hitherto. This does not simply mean a greater use of mass media. It may mean a more enlightened attempt to reach informed opinion and to explain the ‘nuts and bolts’ of Army and Police strategy. In particular it poses the question whether Ministers and MPs ought not to be more fully briefed on the thinking behind present methods of counter-terrorism. And this in turn pre-supposes a somewhat closer interrelationship between civil, military and planning at the level between broad policies on the one hand and the conduct of tactical operations on the other.